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Sneddon et al. (2018) authoritatively summarize the compelling and overwhelming evidence for
fish sentience, while methodically dismantling one rather emblematic research paper (Diggles et
al. 2017) intended to discount solid evidence of fish sentience (Lopez-Luna et al. 2017a, 2017b,
2017c, & 2017d). Rather than focusing my analysis on details of this particular dialectic, I prefer
in this commentary to explore the larger practical moral context within which these debates take
place.
Canonical Western philosophy has been (and to a lesser degree, remains) rife with
arguments denying reason, thought, and sentience to animals.1 Although Descartes's is the most
notorious and perhaps extreme view in this regard — a view known as the bête-machine wherein
animals are nothing more than reflexive automata — many philosophers from Aristotle to
contemporary philosophers like Donald Davidson (1982) and Peter Carruthers (1989) deny (to
varying degrees) mentation or even sentience to animals.
In response to immoderate views like Descartes's, Hume (2007/1739) boldly opens Book
I, Section 16 of A Treatise of Human Nature, "Of the reason of animals," by attacking such views
as "stupid and ignorant":
Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to defend it;
and no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endow’d with thought
and reason as well as men. The arguments are in this case so obvious, that they never
escape the most stupid and ignorant. (p. 118)
1

Sneddon et al. note that "[s]ome authors even feel the need to refer to 'humans and animals,' as if humans were
not themselves animals." Though I sometimes use the term “alloanimals” to refer to nonhuman animals, in this
brief piece, I use the term “animal” to describe nonhuman animals while fully recognizing that humans are, in fact,
animals.
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What reasons have philosophers and scientists offered to deny such an "evident" truth? Sneddon
et al. suggest that sentience is often denied because "sentience is at the heart of the decision
about whether to provide animals with legislative protection" (p. 3). This sentiment suggests that
unwelcomed moral, social, and practical implications may motivate claims for sentience denial
rather than objective empirical data in concert with the pursuit of truth. It is this aspect of
sentience denial that I wish to explore in this brief commentary.
As noted, it is not uncommon to find arguments denying cognition or sentience — or
arguments against employing the precautionary principle (Birch 2017) — to rely on more than
merely data (in the case of science) or conceptual arguments (in the case of philosophy). These
arguments often argue backwards from unacceptable practical consequences of taking seriously
the sentience of some animals, to the conclusion that we can't take the proposition seriously. The
general form of these arguments looks something like this:
1. If (certain species of) animals are sentient, then that would have practical consequence X.
2. X is unacceptable.
3. Therefore, (certain species of) animals are not sentient.

In Discourse on the Method (1988/1637), Descartes offers a number of arguments against animal
sentience, one of which is this: since the possession of sentience requires an immortal soul that
survives death, it is "unimaginable" that human souls should share the eternal afterlife with things
such as flies and ants, oysters and sponges.
More recently, philosopher Peter Carruthers (1989) argues that since animals lack the
ability to entertain second-order beliefs, the "experiences" of animals must be "nonconscious"
and thus they feel no pain. Consequently, they are not the proper subjects of moral concern. In
fact, Carruthers argues that we have a "moral imperative" to suppress our sympathies when we
see an animal in severe "pain" since — given that they are merely reflexive automata — they are
actually not in pain. Carruthers (1992) goes so far as to describe animal welfare as "an irrelevance
to be opposed" (p. 168).
In a recent target article in this journal, Key (2016) denies fish sentience, warning against
applying the precautionary principle in questions of fish welfare for fear of "catastrophic effects"
including "inappropriate approaches to fish welfare" and negative economic impacts for the
fishing industry (p. 3).
What all these views (and others like them) share is a resistance to the moral implications
of taking animal sentience seriously. "Unacceptable" moral, practical, or economic consequences
should not drive answers to empirical questions regarding animal sentience, specifically in this
case, fish sentience. This is bad faith, plain and simple.2
With regard to the precautionary principle as applied to fish welfare (as with any decision
that uses the precautionary principle), the proportionality of the risk of harm must be weighed
against the cost and feasibility of a proposed action. In the case of fish, the number slaughtered
annually is at least twelve times the size of the current human population. This is clearly a moral
atrocity. By any moral calculus, applying the precautionary principle regarding fish welfare is
reasonable and prudential, if not obligatory.
2

See Sanbonmatsu's (2011) masterful essay on the relationship between speciesism and bad faith.
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Last, though I whole-heartedly applaud the work of Sneddon et al. (2018) as heroic in its
rigor and tenacity as a counterattack in defense not only of fish sentience, but of fish, I think the
question of fish sentience is actually a moral canard. Let me explain. Currently approximately 68
billion vertebrate land animals (Faunalytics 2018) — whom we know, with as close to scientific
certainty as possible, are sentient — live lives of abject misery, while they suffer and die in grisly,
ghastly, ghoulish ways, all for human consumption. Despite scientific consensus on
cow/pig/chicken sentience, and despite legislative welfare regulations, animals still endure
horrific unnecessary suffering at the hands of humans. What this shows is that the question of
animal sentience is less about the pursuit of truth, and more about a speciesist agenda — a moral
conclusion in search of data, scientific findings, and legitimating arguments. Near-certainty
regarding sentience will not end speciesism nor human supremacy. That enterprise does not
require better science, research methodologies, or conceptual arguments. That enterprise
requires moral transcendence.
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